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Even if we all agree that one principal function of assertion is to provide testimony, we 
might debate how that interpersonal function informs the nature of assertion. Suppose 
we do agree that assertion has an interpersonal nature because it is a speech act apt for 
the provision of testimony. We might nonetheless interpret that proposition in two dif-
ferent ways. One approach conceives the relation between assertion and testimony as 
additive: testimony is what you get when you add this interpersonal element to an asser-
tion. 4e other approach is subtractive: assertion is what you get when you subtract the 
interpersonal element from testimony. 4is divergence in approach emerges because we 
can ask which speech act is fundamental.
Should we understand assertion as basic and treat testimony as what you get when 
you add an interpersonal addressee? Or should we understand testimony as basic and 
treat mere assertion—assertion without testimony—as what you get when you subtract 
that interpersonal relation? In this chapter, I’ll argue for the second approach and for the 
more general thesis that its treatment of the interpersonal element in assertion makes 
understanding the interpersonal element in assertion the key to understanding how 
assertion expresses belief. Rather than viewing testimony as interpersonalizing asser-
tion, which expresses belief, we should view belief as internalizing assertion, which itself 
internalizes the interpersonal element in testimony. I won’t have space for a full discus-
sion of how assertion expresses belief. My aim is to show how we might theorize the 
expression of belief if we take the subtractive approach, treating the expression of belief 
in assertion as internalizing the transmission of belief in testimony.
I’ll argue that what we say about how assertion internalizes the interpersonal element 
in testimony depends on how we conceptualize that interpersonal element. On what I’ll 
call the Command Model, the interpersonal element in testimony does not give us the 
conceptual resources to make a theoretically informative subtractive move. But on an 
alternative, which I’ll call the Custodial Model, it does. 4e di5erence between these 
models lies in whether they theorize testimony as inviting a trust relation over and above 
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mere reliance on the speaker: the Custodial Model does, I’ll argue, whereas the 
Command Model does not. 4us equipped with the idea that assertion internalizes a 
robust trust relation, our approach to belief expression can emphasize how an asserter 
regards herself as entitled to provide testimony to potential addressees. We’ll be ready to 
see how mere assertion—assertion without testimony—nonetheless responds to an 
epistemic norm that is robustly interpersonal: assert only when you could provide testi-
monial warrant to a potential addressee. 4ough I won’t have space to discuss this fully, 
I’ll suggest that this norm provides as assertion-based constraint on belief.
1. An Overview of the Approach
Let me say more up front about this distinction between an additive and a subtractive 
approach to assertion. We might begin from the lexical distinction between two verbs, 
“to assert” and “to tell.” In terms of their grammatical objects, what you assert is a propo-
sition (“that p”), whereas what you tell is a person. 4ough what you tell the person is a 
proposition (“that p”), the grammatical fact that in English you can “tell” but cannot 
“assert” a person suggests a simple formula for distinguishing the speech acts. If we treat 
this di5erence between the verb forms as a guide to the di5erence between assertion and 
testimony, as I plan to do, taking for granted that in testifying you do not merely assert 
that p but tell someone that p, then we get this di5erence between assertion and testi-
mony: assertion puts you into relation to a proposition, testimony into relation with an 
addressee. Since you cannot testify that p without asserting that p, we might frame this 
model as additive: assertion puts you in relation to a proposition—the “presenting-
as-true” relation—and testifying then adds a relation to an addressee. Plausible as that 
sounds, in this essay I’ll present grounds for rejecting it. As I’ve said, I’ll argue for a sub-
tractive alternative, on which mere assertion subtracts the key interpersonal element 
from testimony.
Why does the additive model sound so plausible? We might trace its plausibility to a 
simple—I’m going to argue, an oversimple—view of the “presenting-as-true” relation: 
you present p as true by presenting yourself as judging that p. Because it is possible to 
present yourself as judging that p without asserting that p, this is not a su7cient condi-
tion for assertion. But is it even a necessary condition? Complementing this simple view 
of assertion is an equally simple view of sincerity in assertion: you assert that p sincerely 
only if you judge that p. To test the simple views together, we ask: can you assert that p 
sincerely while failing to judge that p? I’m going to argue that you can and therefore that 
each of these simple views is too simple.
What explains how you can assert that p sincerely without judging that p, I’ll argue, 
lies in a correct understanding of the distinction between assertion and testimony. 
When we understand how the distinction permits this possibility, we’ll see why the 
additive view of the distinction should give way to a subtractive view. We better explain 
the core di5erence between assertion and testimony by saying that testimony puts 
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you  into relation with an actual addressee, and mere assertion—assertion without 
testimony—subtracts this actual relation, treating the addressee as merely possible. I’ll 
explain why sincerity does not require believing what you assert in Section 8. I’ll begin 
in Section 2 with an account of testimony, developing the approach to the subtractive 
view that will inform my explanation.
Let me set a framework for my approach to testimony. What is it for a speaker, S, to 
present as true some proposition, p, in the way that puts her into testimonial relation 
with her addressee, A? As I’ve already suggested, we have a simple verb: S tells A that p. 
We may thus distinguish two speech acts, (i) telling A that p and (ii) asserting that 
p without thereby telling anyone that p. (We might need to admit the possibility that S 
tells some hearers but not others; let’s set that aside for now.) How does S address A in 
telling A that p? 4e form of address appears to rest on S’s intentions toward A. As is 
arguably the case with any communicative speech act, S will communicate in part by 
aiming that her act be recognized as such by A. She will intend that her assertion be rec-
ognized as an assertion and that her telling be recognized as a telling. But how, beyond 
merely intending that A recognize the act, does S intend to do anything for A?
4e question addresses the nature of the authority that S claims in addressing her 
telling to A—not merely the authority of truth but an authority speci@cally for A. I’ll 
develop a contrast between two broadly di5erent ways of viewing that authority. Each of 
these models of authority rests on an analogy between epistemic authority and practical 
authority, though neither conAates epistemic reasons with practical reasons. 4e task 
for each is to supplement the authority of truth—which includes the authority of 
 ep i ste mic reasons, however exactly one understands the nature of epistemic reasons—
with a dimension of authority that brings the authority of truth to bear on the address-
ee’s particular circumstances. 4e question is how S is doing that for A.
On the Command Model, the speaker intends her addressee to recognize her authority 
in the way that one issuing a command intends the command to be received: by produc-
ing the relevant change in attitude. As a sincere commander intends her addressee to 
obey the command, so a sincere testi@er intends her addressee to believe her testimony. 
(As we’ll see, the analogy goes only so far. 4ere is, of course, the disanalogy that one 
cannot comply with a testimonial command simply at will.) On the Custodial Model, 
by contrast, the pertinent analogy is not with commanding but with advising and 
promising: advising insofar as it o5ers an authoritative reason to do what the advisor 
advises the advisee to do, promising insofar as it o5ers an authoritative reason to per-
form acts that depend on the promisor’s keeping the promise. (Again, the limits of the 
analogy are marked by a key disanalogy: testimony that p, unlike advice or a promise, 
aims to give not merely a reason but su7cient reason to believe that p.) S’s aim, on the 
Custodial Model, is not to convince her addressee but to reason with him—to give him 
reasons to believe what she tells him, reasons grounded in her trustworthiness in thus 
attempting to inAuence him. Seeing why we should prefer the Custodial Model over 
the Command Model provides the key to understanding the distinction between testi-
mony and assertion. 4e di5erence rests on a distinction between the aims of reasoning 
and persuasion.
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I’ll argue by developing a challenge to the thesis that unites the two models of 
 testimony. Each account has a broadly Gricean structure: S intends to do something for 
A through A’s recognition of this very intention. 4e challenge is that these reAexive 
intentions are too complicated to serve as the currency of ordinary communicative 
transactions. I’ll argue that the Custodial Model o5ers a compelling response to the 
challenge and that this response is not available to a proponent of the Command Model.
2. The Developmental Challenge
In pursuing the idea that the distinction between assertion and testimony has some-
thing to do with the interpersonal nature of the latter, I’m going to take for granted what 
is sometimes called the Interpersonal View of testimony, of which the Command Model 
and the Custodial Model are divergent interpretations. On any interpretation of the 
Interpersonal View, the form of address distinctive of testimony rests on a claim of 
authority: in telling A that p, S represents herself as intending that A be authorized—
that is, warranted (or justi@ed)—in believing that p through A’s recognition of this very 
intention.1
Let me clarify a few things in that formula. First, though I’ll say “warranted,” for present 
purposes I make no distinction between warrant and justi@cation. Second, I don’t mean 
to take for granted that the content of S’s intention directly targets A’s status as war-
ranted. Readers skeptical of the idea that the content of S’s intention can directly target 
anything but S’s own actions may substitute this more complex formula: “S represents 
herself as intending that her testimony should form part of the explanation of how 
A comes to be warranted in believing that p.” Another way to specify the content is to say 
that S intends to provide part of A’s warrant for this belief—that is: S intends to serve as 
an authority for A on this epistemic matter. On the Interpersonal View, what mediates 
this exercise of authority is A’s recognition of S’s intention to exercise it. But—a third 
clari@cation—from the proposition that A becomes warranted through his recognition 
of S’s intention, it does not follow that the intention on its own provides the warrant. S 
may intend that A’s recognition of her intention serve as the medium through which A is 
warranted in his belief while regarding her own status as truth-conducively reliable as a 
necessary condition on A’s possession of the warrant. Indeed, it is plausible and perfectly 
compatible with the Interpersonal View to hold that S cannot provide epistemic warrant 
through testimony without actually being truth-conducively reliable in her testimony. 
We may, for our purposes, set aside a much-debated question in the epistemology of 
testimony: can the speaker’s “word” serve as an epistemic basis for the addressee’s 
belief, independently of her truth-conducive reliability (which may be evident to non-
addressees)?2 Our issue lies in the illocutionary nature of the speech act, and speci@cally 
in the claim that telling di5ers from merely asserting by virtue of the speaker’s intentions 
in performing the speech acts. Again, it may be that all speech acts rest on illocutionary 
intentions directed toward hearers’ recognition of the speech act. 4e claim at issue here 
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is stronger: that in sincerely telling A that p, S intends that A be authorized to believe 
that p in part through A’s recognition of this very intention.3
On the Interpersonal View, there is a reAexivity in the testimonial speech act that 
mimics the reAexivity that H.  P.  Grice viewed as the basis of speaker’s meaning.4 
Consider this update:
(Quasi-Grice) S tells A that p (sincerely) only if S intends that A recognize that S, in 
putting it forth that p, intends A to gain access, through this very recognition, to a 
species of reason to believe that p.
On the Command Model, as we’ll see in Section 4, the reason in question is “preemptive.” 
On the Custodial Model, as we’ll see in Section  6, the reason is not “preemptive.” 
What matters for now is that both models entail (Quasi-Grice). Any view that entails 
(Quasi-Grice) has the following feature: in order for the telling to come o5—for it not to 
“mis@re” in Austin’s sense (1975, 13–17)—A must recognize that S intends him to gain 
access to this reason through this very recognition.
Both models of testimony confront a singular challenge. By (Quasi-Grice), S counts 
as telling only by projecting this image of A: A comes to have a reason to believe whose 
epistemic-normative basis partly lies in his recognition of S’s intention. (Again: partly 
lies. Another part of the basis may lie in the more straightforwardly epistemic consider-
ation that S is truth-conducively reliable in her testimony.) Moreover, A undergoes that 
normative change only by projecting this image of S: S intends him to undergo the 
change by recognizing her intention that he undergo it. Each party to the testimonial 
relation must therefore be capable of attributing to the other a higher-order mental state, 
either the state of believing that one’s own mental state has a certain normative quality or 
the state of intending that one’s own intention has a certain normative quality. 4e prob-
lem is simply that this feature of the Interpersonal View appears to exclude people whom 
we should not exclude: small children, autistic people, and anyone else su5ering from a 
cognitive de@cit when it comes to ascribing higher-order mental states.
Here’s how Nick Leonard puts the challenge, in a paper devoted to developing it:
In order for S to satisfy the conditions in T [our (Quasi-Grice)], she must have the 
cognitive capacity to attribute second order mental states to others. Similarly, in 
order for A to satisfy the conditions in T, he too must have the cognitive capacity to 
attribute second order mental states to others. But young children and people with 
autism cannot attribute second order mental states to others. (2016, 2342)
I’m not going to put much weight on how the challenge might draw on empirical 
research in developmental psychology or the psychology of autism. If the challenge were 
merely that small children or autistic people constitute counterexamples to the 
Interpersonal View, we could treat the Interpersonal View as o5ering a revision of our 
practices. Is it so implausible to regard small children or autistic people as manifesting a 
diminished capacity to pull their weight in realizing the second-personal relations at the 
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core of testimonial telling? Such a de@cit would not compromise their capacity to give 
and receive information through mere assertion, treating assertion as capable of providing 
evidence. I’m going to focus on the Developmental Challenge, but with an emphasis on 
explaining why the developmental task in bringing children into our practices of testi-
mony should take this deeply interpersonal form. 4e intuitive challenge is simply that 
it shouldn’t be this “hard”—this much of a cognitive achievement—to tell someone that 
p. Small children do it, but so do inattentive, fatigued, and otherwise cognitively impaired 
people, and an account of telling should do justice to these everyday possibilities. What 
we need is an account of why the norm should require so much of us, interpersonally 
speaking, even if we oKen fall short of living up to these interpersonal demands.
It will help us see why the challenge does not pose mere counterexamples to consider 
a parallel challenge. Proponents of the Interpersonal View oKen emphasize parallels 
between testimony and action-oriented speech acts such as commanding and advising. 
Proponents of both the Command Model and the Custodial Model have developed an 
analogy between testifying and promising (Hinchman 2005; Moran 2005; Watson 2004; 
cf. Austin [1946] 1979, 100). It seems plausible that S promises A that she will φ only if 
A recognizes S’s intention that he should rely on her to φ. But parental S can promise 
childish A that she will let A watch a video as soon as A @nishes picking up his Legos—
counterexample! Childish A cannot recognize S’s intention that he should rely on her to 
let him watch a video, since he cannot recognize any of S’s intentions directed at his 
mental states. So parental S cannot make the promise—an absurdity.
Where has this reasoning gone wrong? Parents can, of course, enter into promissory 
relations with their children, but part of the point of doing so is to teach children from 
the inside how promising works. Part of how promising works involves the promisee’s 
recognition of the promisor’s intention that that promisee should rely on the promise—
a promissory intention that, if relevantly trustworthy, assists the promisee in planning. 
In his childish way, A thus plans on his getting some video time just as soon as he @n-
ishes picking up his Legos. How might proceeding as if the child can recognize her 
intention, even when he cannot, help teach the child how promising works by teaching 
him how to recognize such promissory intentions?
We can ask the same of testimony. Testimony aims to give assistance in forming 
beliefs, not (directly) in planning for the future. But on the Interpersonal View the nor-
mative structures otherwise run in parallel. How might proceeding as if the child can 
recognize her intention help teach him how testimony works by teaching him how to 
recognize quasi-Gricean intentions?
3. Recognizing Intentions  
and Recognizing Authority
My answer addresses the role of such intentions, whether promissory or testimonial. 
What does the promisor or testi@er hope to provide through the recognition of her 
s
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intention? One apt word for the provision is “authority.” 4e promisor aims to assist the 
promisee in planning by exercising a species of rational authority over the promisee’s 
diachronic practical agency. She does not aim at inAuencing him to do any particular 
thing, but if sincere she does aim to get him to rely, as he sees @t, on her promissory 
assurance that she will φ. 4e sincere testi@er aims to provide a parallel species of ep i ste-
mic assistance grounded in the trustworthiness—the rational authority—of her claim 
on an aspect of her addressee’s epistemic agency: he may judge in a way informed by her 
assurance that p. How does she make either claim—a claim that primarily lies in how 
she represents herself as making available a reason—on the pertinent aspect of her 
addressee’s agency? By getting him to recognize her intention. But what if he has not yet 
developed the capacity to recognize such quasi-Gricean intentions? In that case, she’ll 
have to get him to feel the force of her authority more directly.
4ere is a pun on “recognize” here, but it is easy to clarify the two senses of the term. 
In one kind of case, A recognizes S’s intention to provide him such assistance by cor-
rectly attributing that intention to S. In a second kind of case, A recognizes S’s intention 
to provide the assistance by correctly attributing to S the authority over his agency that S 
claims by virtue of possessing that intention to provide him the assistance. In the second 
kind of case, A need not be able to attribute quasi-Gricean intentions to S; A need merely 
be able to attribute a certain species of authority to S. What authority? In promising, the 
authority to provide a special kind of assistance in planning. In testimony, the authority 
to provide a special kind of assistance in forming beliefs. It is important to note that each 
speech act provides the assistance only if it, or its maker, is relevantly trustworthy, which 
in each case requires relevant species of reliability. Assuming it is present, this trustwor-
thiness is manifest in S’s intention, and it is in that respect that his recognition of the 
intention mediates the provision of the assistance to A. If a childish A cannot attribute a 
quasi-Gricean intention to S, we may preserve the normative structure by shiKing from 
the @rst sense of “recognize” to the second. Childish A recognizes S’s quasi-Gricean 
intention by correctly attributing not the intention itself but the authority it manifests.
We can thus say that childish A can acquire a testimonial reason through his recogni-
tion of S’s intention to provide that reason, without committing ourselves to the thesis 
that anyone capable of acquiring a testimonial reason must be capable of attributing 
reAexive or quasi-Gricean intentions. My apparent equivocation on “recognize” in stat-
ing the uptake condition on telling turns out to reveal our core theoretical need. Small 
children can provide the uptake required to consummate acts of testimonial telling, but 
they do so by recognizing—at most—the authority of the intention. By “the authority of 
the intention,” I mean the authority of the speech act that expresses or manifests the 
intention, and I will not for present purposes distinguish this from the authority of the 
speaker insofar as she performs that act.5 An adult addressee does not consummate an 
act of telling by “recognizing” the intention in that sense. An adult addressee typically 
recognizes the intention informing the speaker’s act, not merely that intention’s authority. 
Does this proliferate senses of “tells” as we shiK from immature to mature reception of a 
“telling”? I think not. Look at it from the speaker’s side. A sincere testi@er aims to provide 
a reason to her addressee partly through the addressee’s recognition of her sincerity. 
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to develop his capacity to attribute intentions? 4at seems a degenerate case, until we 
realize that he cannot develop a capacity to attribute testimonial intentions without 
being addressed in this way—in a way that presumes his possession of a capacity that he 
does not yet fully possess. 4e observation reveals not equivocation but a developmen-
tal prolepsis: the speaker addresses the child as if he already had the capacity that he will 
develop partly through being thus addressed.
4e phenomenon is not unusual. Are you playing chess with a child who, in his imper-
fect grasp of strategy, manifests an imperfect grasp on what it is to win? Are you playing 
tennis with a child who, in his physical stature, manifests a hopeless inability to win? 
Well, yes and no. You’re bringing the child into the full game by treating his capacities as 
if they were more developed than they actually are. And so it is with testimony: as a testi-
@er, you invite the child to trust you—that is, to treat you as an epistemic authority—
despite his imperfect grasp on how treating someone as an epistemic authority makes a 
demand on his capacity for reasonable trust. To develop this capacity, the child will have 
to improve at attributing reAexive intentions.
4e question, then, is what form the improvement should take. We have envisioned a 
developmental process that would take the small child from the immature incapacity to 
recognize anything more than a speaker’s authority to the mature capacity to recognize 
such authority by recognizing the reAexive, quasi-Gricean intentions that inform it. To 
believe a speaker through an exercise of reasonable trust as her addressee, you must be 
able to recognize more than her bare authority; you must be able to recognize how she 
manifests that authority in her form of address. Must the immature addressee begin by 
believing through responsiveness to evidence that the speaker is positively worthy of his 
trust? Or should we instead say that maturation begins from responsiveness to evidence 
that the speaker is unworthy of his trust—evidence that overturns a default presump-
tion of trustworthiness?
We can answer by reminding ourselves how we actually oversee such maturation. 
Adults teach small children how to stand in promissory relations; that’s part of the point 
of making promises to a child. Adults similarly teach small children how to stand in tes-
timonial relations. Let me o5er some reminders of how these lessons work, beginning 
with the latter case. Part of the point of telling a child about the world is to help the child 
sort out how you intend him to react. You tell him something surprising. Really? he 
wonders. No, you’re being sarcastic. Later you surprise him with another assertion. 
More sarcasm? No, this time you’re serious. For very small children, think of their devel-
oping grasp on the di5erence between fanciful bedtime stories and factual narratives 
about your day. If you talk to small children regularly, observe what a substantial part of 
your conversations thus addresses how to read your intentions. 4e same holds of prom-
ising. Do you really mean it when you promise him candy tomorrow, or are you saying 
that merely to make him stop pestering you now? In each case, your task addresses how 
the child must navigate an interpersonal reality in which intentions manifest unworthi-
ness of his trust. 4e default stance is trust, since healthy children are naturally trusting. 
Your task is to supplement that stance with a capacity to respond to evidence manifested 
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4is developmental observation reveals a crucial complexity in how trust responds to 
evidence. One might assume that trust responds to evidence of trustworthiness, but 
trust can be reasonable without such evidence, as long as it is informed by a counterfac-
tual sensitivity to evidence of untrustworthiness in the trusted: if she manifests evidence 
of untrustworthiness, you will cease to trust; and if she had manifested evidence of 
untrustworthiness, you would not have trusted. Further reAection reveals a deeper 
point: not only does reasonable trust not require responsiveness to evidence of trust-
worthiness, but too much monitoring for evidence of trustworthiness tends to under-
mine trust. We’re thus pulled in two directions. On the one hand, we assume that trust is 
made more reasonable through its responsiveness to evidence of trustworthiness. On 
the other hand, we see that dwelling on evidence of trustworthiness is inimical to trust. 
One might think this is a problem of actively seeking evidence of trustworthiness, not of 
appreciating the force of evidence already possessed. But matters are not so simple: if my 
reliance on my spouse to remember to fetch our children aKer school depends on my 
appreciating positive evidence of her reliability—no need to seek such evidence, since 
I already have plenty!—then I am not simply trusting her to fetch the children. (Why do 
I need the evidence? Don’t I trust her?). 4e problem here is not that I am aware of this 
evidence. 4e problem is that my would-be trust depends on it. Still, doesn’t such evi-
dence make my trust in my spouse more reasonable than it would otherwise be? 4e 
solution lies in seeing that this evidence of her trustworthiness is also evidence that 
there is not likely to be evidence that she is untrustworthy. 4is evidence that there is not 
likely to be evidence of her untrustworthiness can make it reasonable for me to be less 
vigilant than I might otherwise have been in exercising the responsiveness to evidence 
of her untrustworthiness that informs my trust.
Two issues arise here that I lack space to pursue as fully as I’d like. 4e @rst I’ll discuss 
brieAy and then set aside. I just observed that to trust a testi@er is to believe her through 
the exercise of your counterfactual sensitivity to evidence of her untrustworthiness, not 
(directly) through your appreciation of evidence of her trustworthiness. But how can 
you exercise your will toward this end? Kieran Setiya (2013) does not believe you can, 
and he treats this incapacity as a deep problem for the possibility of epistemic agency. 
4ough you are in some sense active in forming the belief that p for epistemic reasons R, 
Setiya argues, the idea that you are an epistemic agent in believing for R presupposes 
that you can mark a distinction within your total epistemic reasons for p between those 
that @gure in R—by serving as the ground of your belief—and those that do not, just as 
when you perform an action, φ, for reasons, you can distinguish those reasons from 
other reasons, on which you are not acting, that you nonetheless believe you have to φ. 
Can you distinguish your reasons for believing that p from the totality of reasons that 
you believe you have to believe that p? Setiya argues that you cannot, but if what I said 
earlier is right, we have identi@ed a way to make the distinction e5ective. Say you believe 
that p by believing the speaker but nonetheless believe that you could have reasonably 
believed that p by stepping back and assessing evidence of the speaker’s trustworthiness—
without believing the speaker. Here your belief that p for reasons R does not reduce to 
your belief that p plus your belief that you have R. Just as in a parallel practical case, we 
I
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must say more, and more speci@cally about how you have chosen to believe, in order to 
explain how your epistemic activity responds to reasons.6
I’ll have to leave that issue dangling, but a second issue presages an aspect of my 
argument for the Custodial Model—though I’ll lack space for a full treatment. When 
you teach a child reasonable trust, you thereby help him learn a form of evidential 
responsiveness that will play a key role in his developing intrapersonal relations. 4e 
Interpersonal View suggests a parallel not only between the normative structures of 
promising and testifying but between the two processes through which a developing 
agent can internalize those structures. Consider @rst a normative parallel between 
promising and intending. When parental S promises childish A to φ at t, she presents 
herself as providing him with planning assistance that parallels the planning assistance 
that he could provide himself if he intended to φ at t. Now consider a parallel between 
testimony and doxastic judgment. As in promising, the core of the parallel lies in how 
the reliability of an intention can provide a trusting agent with assistance—though here 
the assistance is epistemic, not practical. When S tells A that p, S intends that A acquire a 
rational basis for p simply through his recognition of that intention.7 And when A 
judges that p, A intends that he acquire a rational basis for p simply through his recogni-
tion of that—that is, his own—intention. In the case of doxastic judgment, there is of 
course this rub: because you can judge that p without understanding how judgment 
normatively rests on such an intrapersonal trust relation, by “recognizing” the intention 
we cannot mean attributing it. Here we have to mean that A recognizes the authority of 
his own intention to provide this rational basis. In that respect, the case resembles testi-
mony addressed to a small child. Just as you need not self-attribute an intention when 
you recognize the authority of the intention informing your judgment that p, so A need 
not attribute any intention to S when A recognizes the authority of the intention inform-
ing S’s testimony that p. In teaching childish A how to reasonably trust a testi@er, S helps 
teach A how to reasonably trust his own judgment.
4. The Command Model
4e goal of the developmental process lies in the maturation of the child’s capacity for 
reasonable trust. But our last observation clari@es that what most fundamentally 
matures is the child’s intellectual conscience. As Linda Zagzebski (2012) emphasizes, 
part of the job of your intellectual conscience is to regulate your self-trust relations, 
adjudicating a question that articulates the status of self-trust as a rational relation: on 
which occasions should you trust yourself, and on which should you instead trust 
someone else? 4e species of self-trust at issue here is trust in your own judgment, in the 
deliverances of your own doxastic-deliberative faculty when you deliberate what is so 
(by contrast with practical deliberation, which addresses the question what to do). Self-
trust would not be an exercise of rationality if you necessarily trusted your own judgment, 
if nothing could dislodge a childish presumption that your doxastic-deliberative faculty 
could never, from your own point of view, be unworthy of your trust. Your own point of 
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view on the question of what is so is not simply identical with the perspective that you 
adopt when you deliberate what is so. You are capable of stepping back and suspending 
your judgment in response to evidence that this deliberative faculty is not, in its current 
incarnation, worthy of your trust. One key role for your intellectual conscience is to 
determine when you should thus suspend your own judgment and seek deliberative 
assistance from others—not mere evidence that you would in turn weigh in your own 
deliberation, but a kind of reason to which you could gain access through an exercise of 
reasonable trust.
Zagzebski theorizes this dimension of intellectual conscience in terms of what she 
calls, following Joseph Raz, “preemptive reasons” (Raz 1986; Zagzebski 2012), thereby 
@lling the blank in the generic formulation of the Interpersonal View (Quasi-Grice) 
with a speci@c kind of reason. 4e analogy with Raz’s issue suggests that we call this the 
Command Model:
(Command) S tells A that p (sincerely) only if S intends that A recognize that S, in 
putting it forth that p, intends A to gain access, through this very recognition, to a 
preemptive reason to believe that p.
One might think that the Command Model, thus formulated, plays right into the 
hands of the Developmental Challenge insofar as it would require that the child rec-
ognize an intention with esoteric content marked here by the word “preemptive.” But 
that is not the worry articulated by the Developmental Challenge, as I’m deploying it. 
As long as preemptive reasons function in a way that is intelligible to an immature 
addressee—and I’ll assume they do, in the way that I’ll describe presently—then no 
new issue arises here, no issue, that is, beyond the Developmental Challenge itself, as 
described in Section 2.
4e key feature of preemption, as Zagzebski understands it, is that when you accept 
someone as an epistemic authority, you cease to base your belief on what I’ll call “your 
own” reasons—that is, the reasons that you have, or would have, independently of this 
authority—and base your belief solely on the preemptive reasons that the authority 
gives you. Believing on the basis of a preemptive reason contrasts with two sorts of alter-
native case. In one alternative case, you treat the new reason as a higher-order reason 
targeting your assessment of your @rst-order reasons—that is, your assessment of the 
evidence. In such a case, you treat the new reason as either con@rming your assessment 
of available evidence or as showing that you’ve misassessed available evidence. 4e latter 
possibility could induce self-doubt but would not point a way forward in resolving the 
doubt. When you thus mistrust your own judgment, how might you resolve it? You can, 
of course, turn your mind to other matters, and your trust in your judgment will typically 
revive. But how can you revive trust on the present matter? In the other alternative case, 
you add the new reason to your own reasons by treating it as the deliverance of your 
capacity for reasonable trust, basing it not on positive evidence but on your counterfactual 
responsiveness to evidence of untrustworthiness—that is, of relevant unreliability—in 
the speaker. If we embrace either of these alternatives, we deny that the reasons are “pre-
emptive,” in Zagzebski’s sense, since a preemptive reason would simply “replace” the 
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reasons that you have independently of this authority, and these alternative reasons do 
not function in that way.
In resisting these alternative conceptions of authority, Zagzebski follows Raz by empha-
sizing what Raz calls the Normal Justi@cation thesis: in the case at issue, you are more likely 
to act on your total reasons if you follow the authority—treating its directives as giving you 
preemptive reasons (in the present sense)—instead of trying to determine how its direc-
tives add to “your own” reasons (in the present sense), whether as higher-order reasons or 
as reasons whose basis lies in your capacity for reasonable trust. No doubt there are plenty 
of cases that @t that model where the reasons in question are practical reasons. When the 
soldier treats his commander’s directives, or a citizen treats the law, as giving him none but 
reasons that add to his own reasons or a7rm his assessment of his own reasons, there is an 
obvious respect in which he isn’t treating the commander or the law as an authority. But 
there appears to be an important contrast between practical and epistemic reasons on this 
point. If you treat certain scientists as giving you reasons that add to or a7rm your view of 
your own reasons, is there any interesting or important respect in which you thereby fail to 
treat the scientists in question as authorities?
Scienti@c and more broadly epistemic authority appears to di5er here from military 
or legal authority. One plausible explanation of the di5erence would appeal to the di5er-
ent roles played by conscience in these distinct domains. A soldier’s job is to implement 
his or her commanders’ directives, not to form a view of why those directives are or are 
not correct. A law-abiding citizen follows the law and may—within limits—have no 
particular interest in forming or assessing it. But an intellectually conscientious person 
cannot simply leave it up to scientists to tell him or her what to believe about the world—
even, in a way paralleling legal obligation, “within limits” (e.g., up to the point where 
odd declarations reveal that a given scientist has gone o5 her meds). 4at’s one thing 
that’s so farcical about one species of ideological skepticism—doubt conjoined with the 
proclamation, “I’m no scientist!”—about global warming. Sure, you’re not a scientist, we 
want to reply, but you have to take an interest in such a scienti@c issue and do your best 
to sort it out. Unless your “sorting it out” leads you to pursuing graduate studies, and so 
on, you’re going to be forming many of your beliefs about the issue on authority. But “on 
authority” does not appear to mean the same here as it does in the military or legal cases, 
and what it does mean appears to be at odds with the idea that the authorities give us 
preemptive reasons. 4e di5erence, again, appears to derive from the di5erent roles that 
we regard conscience as playing in the two sorts of case.
5. Can the Command Model Meet a 
Broadened Developmental Challenge?
What we @nd here is an adult instance of the normative dynamic in play in the 
Developmental Challenge. 4e challenge lies not in the addressee’s inability to recognize 
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higher-order mental states but in the addressee’s di7culty, given scienti@c ignorance, in 
exercising his capacity for reasonable trust. 4e parallel con@rms our hypothesis that 
the childish addressee’s inability to recognize higher-order mental states functions in 
the challenge as an instance of a broader inability to exercise a capacity for reasonable 
trust. All of us encounter such a challenge as adults insofar as our ignorance in a given 
domain may lead us to have no choice but to treat some speakers as authorities in a way 
that does not manifest our capacity for reasonable trust, since we must form beliefs 
while lacking a counterfactual sensitivity to evidence of untrustworthiness in the 
trusted.8 Can the Command Model meet this broadened version of the Developmental 
Challenge? I’ll argue that it cannot. My diagnosis of why it cannot will then lead us to see 
why we should prefer the Custodial Model to the Command Model if we adopt the 
Interpersonal View of testimony.
What is it for the addressee to take responsibility for his beliefs in such a case? What 
responsible resolution would he seek? I agree with Christoph Jäger (2016) that the goal 
posited by intellectually conscientious responsiveness to preemptive reasons is under-
standing. Jäger does not emphasize the developmental issue that I have pursued, but 
I have pursued that issue as a special case of a broader challenge, which we may now con-
ceptualize as the challenge of explaining how a capacity for reasonable trust serves the 
broader epistemic value of understanding. As we’ve seen, the challenge has two aspects. 
On the one hand, it overlooks this value to treat believing on the basis of another’s ep i-
ste mic authority according to the model that Raz developed for legal and other forms of 
practical authority. But on the other hand, an emphasis on understanding leaves it open 
that believing on authority does sometimes take this form, perhaps for good and impor-
tant reasons. 4e challenge is to bring these two aspects into simultaneous focus.
Consider again how you conscientiously come to your beliefs about global warming. 
You don’t simply mimic the judgments of climate scientists—treating them as giving 
you preemptive reasons to replace your own. You want to understand why the scientists 
hold these views, at least to the extent that you can understand their reasons and reasoning. 
You want to understand because you need at least some substantial degree of under-
standing in order to be appropriately conscientious in forming these beliefs. In order to 
do this—in order to seek this form of understanding that is at odds with treating author-
itative reasons as preemptive—you must treat some authoritative reasons as preemptive. 
You cannot form “your own” view of global warming without trusting the methods of 
evidence gathering, of instrument construction, of data interpretation, and so on that 
inform how climate scientists pursue their questions. You have to trust others’ judgments 
in the course of developing your own. Perhaps you’ll develop your own judgments—
your own expertise—to the point where you can criticize how these climate scientists’ 
instruments are constructed or maintained, for example, or how they have interpreted 
their data. But probably not; given your age and established dispositions, it might be too 
di7cult. Even if you do go on to develop your own expertise, however, that wouldn’t 
show that you do not now trust the judgment of climate scientists in these ways—where 
to trust their judgment, in your present state of ignorance, is to treat the reasons that you 
thereby receive as preemptive.
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When you take a reason on trust, you receive it through the exercise of your capacity 
for reasonable trust. Insofar as you receive it through exercising this capacity, you treat a 
preemptive reason—a reason that merely replaces your own reasons—as a reason 
grounded in the de facto trustworthiness of the speaker—not (as we saw in Section 4) in 
your evidence of her trustworthiness but in the trustworthiness itself—and you treat 
your responsiveness to the speaker’s trustworthiness as mediated by your counterfac-
tual sensitivity to evidence of her untrustworthiness. Your treating the reason as pre-
emptive thus “looks ahead”—through the lens of your intellectual conscience—toward 
a possible future scenario in which your understanding has developed to enable you to 
manifest this sensitivity to evidence of untrustworthiness. You may know you’re not in 
position even to try to develop a view on your own—working from your own reasons—
of ice-core instrument calibration. Whatever your assumptions about such instruments, 
when you learn how actual scientists use the instruments to gather evidence, you let 
what you learn replace those assumptions, since you know that such assumptions aren’t 
even a good start on actual climate science. What’s crucial, for our purposes, is that the 
story doesn’t end with the observation that you must treat these reasons as preemptive 
by simply accepting these scientists’ authority. You are intellectually conscientious, and 
as such you aim to achieve some degree of relevant understanding. You aim to treat the 
reasons that these authorities give you as adding to or correcting “your own” reasons—
reasons that reAect how you’ve weighed or otherwise reasoned from evidence “on your 
own”—rather than as merely replacing them. And you aim to develop a mediating sensi-
tivity to relevant forms of untrustworthiness in these speakers. Part of what it is to trust 
such a speaker is to believe that it would be reasonable to trust her under the possibly 
hypothetical condition that you have developed that capacity. It is in that belief that even 
immature or ignorant trust di5ers from other forms of reliance, since without the belief 
we couldn’t explain how your trust admits of betrayal.
We thus see how you can treat authoritative reasons as preemptive in a provisional 
spirit, placing trust in the authority’s judgment in the spirit of conceding that you have 
not yet developed—whether or not you will go on to develop—requisite trustworthiness 
(on this subject matter, with regard to such reasons) in your own developing faculty of 
judgment. Your trust in the judgment of the authority is revealed by how you let the 
reasons grounded in this authority’s trustworthiness replace whatever reasons you take 
yourself to have apart from this inAuence. 4ose authoritative reasons preempt the lat-
ter reasons, but in a way that serves the goal of understanding insofar as it underwrites 
your e5orts—paltry and distractible and lifespan-limited though they may be—to 
develop a capacity for reasonable trust that would, perhaps retrospectively, make the 
reasons available as manifesting your intellectual conscience.
Can the Command Model deploy these resources to meet the broadened 
Developmental Challenge? We’re now ready to see why it cannot. 4e Command Model 
does not construe the addressee’s recognition of the speaker’s authority—his recogni-
tion, that is, of her capacity to give him preemptive reasons—as in any way constrained 
by his capacity for reasonable trust, as we have been understanding it with our emphasis 
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on a sensitivity not to evidence of trustworthiness but to evidence of untrustworthiness 
in the speaker. 4e Command Model construes the speaker’s exercise of epistemic 
authority on the model of Raz’s treatment of legal authority—more broadly, of the 
authority of commands. On the Razian model, what gives a command rational authority 
for an addressee—thereby constituting it as a source of preemptive reasons—has 
nothing directly to do with the addressee’s sensitivity to evidence of the speaker’s 
untrustworthiness made manifest by her intentions. On the Command Model, the 
speaker’s exercise of authority, in giving what will weigh with the addressee as a pre-
emptive reason, rests on the latter’s capacity to infer that he does better by treating the 
command as a preemptive reason than he could do by acting on his own independent 
reasons. 4is inferential capacity does not rest on a capacity for reasonable trust. It may 
well be grounded in a capacity to appreciate evidence of the speaker’s trustworthiness. 
But that is part of the problem: this capacity to appreciate evidence of trustworthiness 
functions in a way that appears to preclude what’s distinctive of reasonable trust. As we 
saw in Section 4, a capacity for reasonable trust is a capacity to let yourself be guided by 
an inAuence insofar as that inAuence does not generate evidence that it is unworthy of 
your trust. A speaker’s intention to give you a preemptive reason does not, as such, 
engage that capacity; it does not rest on acknowledging that evidence of her unworthi-
ness of your trust would defeat her presumption to give you this reason. How might the 
speaker aim to engage that capacity? When I present the Custodial Model in the next 
section, it will become clear exactly what the Command Model’s appeal to preemptive 
reasons leaves out.
Would it help to interpret the Command Model as placing equal or even greater 
emphasis on the speaker’s illocutionary burden? A proponent of the Command Model 
might argue that the normative basis of a preemptive reason crucially lies in the speak-
er’s intention to take responsibility for the addressee’s belief.9 When A lets S’s judgment 
replace his own in believing S’s testimony, A e5ectively holds S responsible for his 
belief, a form of responsibility that S may willingly take up, holding herself responsible 
for A’s belief as part of how she exercises her authority over A. Such an emphasis on the 
speaker’s responsibility does not appear to help a proponent of the Command Model 
meet the Developmental Challenge. If S takes full responsibility for A’s belief that p 
formed on the basis of S’s testimony that p, her status as thus responsible does not even 
address the Challenge, since it does not as such have anything to do with her quasi-
Gricean intentions. As the parent of a small child, I take full responsibility for the 
child’s beliefs formed through his reception of my testimony. 4e fact that I take this 
responsibility does not on its own entail or otherwise indicate that I aim to help the 
child develop a capacity for reasonable trust: a status as thus responsible seems per-
fectly compatible with a failure to have that aim. In an alternative formulation, we 
could say that my taking responsibility for my child’s testimonial beliefs may capture 
the normative stance that I take in attempting to persuade him through this exercise of 
authority but does not show that I intend to reason with the child and is compatible 
with my not intending to reason with him.
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6. The Custodial Model
What is it for the speaker to reason with her addressee in this way? Here’s a view that 
would @t this dialectic: S reasons with A insofar as she intends to give him a reason in a 
way that satis@es two criteria: (i) A could not possess this reason apart from S’s interven-
tion, and (ii) the reason is not preemptive in the sense discussed in the previous section. 
It may sound like a contradiction to say both that the reason is not preemptive and that 
A could not possess the reason apart from S’s intervention. On Zagzebski’s view of pre-
emption, if A could not possess the reason apart from S’s intervention, then the reason 
must be preemptive. But, as we saw in the previous section, intending to give someone a 
preemptive reason seems incompatible with intending that he acquire that reason 
through exercising his capacity for reasonable trust. When A trusts S through an exer-
cise of that capacity, he does not simply let S’s judgment replace his own but judges in a 
way guided by his counterfactual sensitivity to evidence of S’s untrustworthiness (should 
there be or have been any). 4is di5erence should @gure in S’s quasi-Gricean intention.
4e Custodial Model thus emerges as an alternative to the Command Model:
(Custodial) S tells A that p (sincerely) only if S intends that A recognize that S, in 
putting it forth that p, intends A to gain access, through this very recognition, to a 
prima facie but su7cient reason to believe that p.
4e key di5erence between (Custodial) and (Command) lies in the phrase “prima facie 
but su7cient.” Since this phrase may sound like a contradiction, let me begin by explain-
ing why the phrase is not a contradiction. 4e reason in question is prima facie because 
it—that is, the presumption that it exists—is subject to defeating conditions. As we’ve 
already seen, if S is not trustworthy in relevant respects, then though she may intend to 
give a reason, there is no reason for her to give. But its defeasibility is not merely a fact 
about the reason itself; the illocutionary normativity of the speech act obligates S to 
acknowledge this fact. Since the reason that S intends A to have to believe that p is a rea-
son that A could not have unless S were relevantly trustworthy, S must acknowledge that 
a status as untrustworthy—which, because it partly rests on her truth-conducive relia-
bility, she cannot be perfectly certain she has avoided—would thwart her intention to 
give this reason. If S is untrustworthy, she can tell A that p (though if she believes she’s 
untrustworthy, this would manifest one form of insincerity), and A can believe that p on 
her say-so, but A cannot thereby count—that is, simply on the basis of trust in S—as 
warranted in that belief. Despite this defeasibility, S intends to make available a reason 
that is normatively su!cient for A to believe that p. 4ough she may not intend that 
A actually believe that p on her say-so (or at all), to count as telling A that p in full sincer-
ity S must intend that A would be fully warranted in believing that p on S’s say-so. By 
normatively “su7cient” I mean su!cient in the relevant doxastic context. By “su7cient” 
in (Custodial), then, I mean that if A believed S, he would not need any further delibera-
tive basis to count, in his context, as warranted in that belief. In this way, S presumes 
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a  custodial authority over A’s epistemic agency, rather than the purely  preemptive 
authority posited by the Command Model. What makes the authority custodial rather 
than command-like is simply that the presumption of authority would be undermined if 
S’s presumption to o5er a reason were defeated.
If you’re tempted to think that this distinction between (Command) and (Custodial) 
makes no di5erence, consider a scenario in which it really would fail to make a di5er-
ence: it would fail to make a di5erence if the only element in a testi@er’s trustworthiness 
were truth-conducive reliability. If trustworthiness were purely truth-conducive, the 
Custodial Model would add little to the account of epistemic authority o5ered by the 
Command Model: the Custodial Model’s emphasis on defeating conditions would 
merely amount to the idea that a speaker who presents herself as an epistemic authority 
may not actually count as one. Where the views di5er lies in how the Custodial Model 
applies its de@nition of telling to the context-sensitive dimension of the addressee’s 
ep i ste mic needs—not merely to his context-insensitive need to believe the truth but to 
his need to close deliberation with a judgment when but only when his evidence is nor-
matively su7cient. 4e point of grounding the reason in the speaker’s trustworthiness is 
to minimize not merely the risk of false belief but the risk of epistemically unwarranted 
belief—that is, of belief that fails to meet the epistemic demands imposed by the address-
ee’s doxastic context. 4e point of appealing to defeating conditions is that one’s status as 
having normatively su7cient evidence does not require that one ratify that the defeating 
conditions are not satis@ed. If they are not satis@ed here, and there thus really is a reason 
in play, then the reason that S intends to make available to A in telling him that p is a rea-
son that normatively su7ces for him to believe that p. 4at is, it normatively su7ces, in 
context, to close doxastic deliberation with a judgment.
One might now worry that the Custodial Model is committed to a controversial view 
of knowledge on which practical considerations illicitly “encroach” upon the properly 
epistemic. 4ough I have defended an account of such pragmatic encroachment 
(Hinchman 2013), one complication in my present use of the idea should remove some 
of this sting of controversy. Where the pragmatic encroaches on the epistemic, accord-
ing to the Custodial Model, is speci@cally in the illocutionary normativity of asserting 
and telling. It might appear otherwise, since the quasi-Gricean accounts of telling under 
consideration appear to describe the epistemic quality of the addressee’s belief. But that 
appearance is misleading: the normative force of that description governs not the 
addressee’s belief but the speaker’s telling. More plainly put, the account of telling 
describes how the speaker goes right or wrong in her speech act (an illocutionary 
matter), not how the addressee goes right or wrong in his belief (a properly epistemic 
matter). One might argue that this illocutionary norm just is an epistemic norm—and, 
indeed, if it is, then the pragmatic will encroach on the epistemic. If you do not like that 
result, however, you can accept a quasi-Gricean account of telling but deny that the illo-
cutionary norm it describes is a properly epistemic norm. No such account need appeal 
directly to the concept of knowledge, and we can formulate the quasi-Gricean appeal to 
warrant or justi@cation just as well, if more cumbersomely, in terms of the status that 
the addressee’s belief must achieve—not necessarily a properly or narrowly epistemic 
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status—in order for the speech act not to violate the illocutionary norm. All that follows 
from the previous paragraph is that if the illocutionary norm is an epistemic norm then 
pragmatic considerations encroach on the epistemic. It is not obvious, however, that this 
illocutionary norm is an epistemic norm.
Setting aside that complication, note that, on the Custodial Model, telling embodies an 
assurance that transpires at two levels. At one level, S presents herself as intending to give 
A a prima facie but su7cient reason to believe that p. At another level, S presents herself 
as intending to make this reason available to A simply through A’s recognition that that is 
what she intends. 4e reason that S intends to give A derives from her assurance that it is 
indeed true that p. At this level, S assures A of p’s truth, and her assurance generates a rea-
son only if she is reliable as a gauge of the truth. 4is core dimension of the speech act is 
alethic: S assures A that she is a source of truth on the question whether p. And so this 
dimension of S’s reliability is truth-conducive, and S’s presumption that she makes the 
reason available is defeated by unreliability as to the truth. S’s intentions have no general 
bearing on whether she is a good guide to the truth (unless, of course, the proposition 
speci@cally refers to S or to something over which S has control). But S’s intentions do 
have a general bearing on whether she is appropriately responsive to another dimension 
of A’s epistemic needs, a dimension that is sensitive to the context in which S addresses 
A. Here we can recognize the custodial dimension of S’s speech act: S assures A that she is 
appropriately concerned with his relevant context-sensitive needs. On the Custodial 
Model, it is by presenting herself as trustworthy in this custodial dimension that S repre-
sents herself as giving A a reason to believe that p speci@cally through her speech act of 
telling him that p. As we’ll see in the next section, it is in presenting herself as aiming to do 
justice to A’s context-sensitive epistemic needs that S counts as reasoning with A on the 
question whether p, rather than merely trying to persuade him that p.
7. How the Custodial Model Meets the 
Broadened Developmental Challenge
In the previous two sections, we have focused on conscientiousness both as the addressee 
manifests it in his responsiveness to the speaker’s authority (Section  5) and as the 
speaker projects it in claiming an authority grounded in her trustworthiness (Section 6). 
We can meet the broadened Developmental Challenge by joining the two sides in an 
account of what it is to be conscientious in asserting when there is no addressee. When 
there is no addressee, the speaker’s conscience requires that she imagine one. How does 
this act of imagination constrain the speaker? If it seems paradoxical to say that the 
speaker’s imagination constrains her assertion, we can Aip the question around: how 
must she be imagining her possible addressees when she regards herself as entitled to 
make an assertion? As we’ll now see in the @nal two sections, these questions reveal the 
explanatory force of the subtractive approach to testimony and assertion.
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4ey do so by returning us to the core instance of intellectual conscience in the 
exercise of judgment. In forming a judgment that p, you trust yourself on the question 
whether p, and in a way that is likewise mediated by your capacity for reasonable trust. 
In learning how to trust, you learn how to occupy both sides of the illocutionary rela-
tion: how to trust and how to invite trust. In learning how to invite trust, you learn not 
merely how to inAuence another but how to inAuence him through his exercise of intel-
lectual conscience, however fallibly (since you may, of course, be deceiving him). 4e 
trust dynamic structures the epistemic agency exercised on both sides of the exchange. 
You learn how to assert by learning how to invite trust.
Consider how this normative dynamic looks in realistic cases of intrapersonal conAict. 
Say you’re experiencing conAict—or, more broadly, a conAictive dissonance—between 
two mental states subject to governance by your intellectual conscience. How do you 
resolve the conAict? An interesting exchange between Zagzebski (2016) and Elizabeth 
Fricker (2016) targets this case: you believe that there is torture, and you want to rid the 
world of torture. Fricker asks: why not eliminate the conAict by abandoning the belief? 
Zagzebski replies: because that would conAict with our desire to believe the truth. 4at 
sounds like the right thing to say about this case, but only because it’s so obvious that you 
should not abandon the belief.
We can see that the case does not do justice to Fricker’s worry about Zagzebski’s treat-
ment of intellectual conscience by working from a case in which things are less obvious. 
Say you believe, without anything like certainty, that a colleague is spreading malicious 
rumors about you, and you want to mitigate the problems that you fear this is causing 
you (behind your back, and again without certainty that the problems are as bad as 
you’re inclined to believe). 4is looks like the same species of conAict as we found in the 
torture case, but it seems that your response could rationally go either way. Perhaps your 
desire for truth leads you to tackle the problem head on. Or perhaps your desire to miti-
gate the problem leads you to choose the way of tact: you pretend that you don’t notice 
the evidence of rumor mongering, in an e5ort to stop thinking about that evidence. 
Whichever way you go, you’re going to have to trust that “part” of you—as you mistrust 
the “part” of you that resists this resolution. If you tactfully ignore the evidence, you still 
have to cope with the part of you that—desiring truth, perhaps—has trouble letting the 
evidence go. If, on the other hand, you pursue the trail of evidence, you still have to cope 
with the part of you that dreads—and, on reAection, appropriately—the unpredictable 
and probably avoidable confrontation with your colleague to which you can see it may 
lead you.
How should we think of these self-relations? It seems that a positive account of ra tion-
al ity must say how self-trust rationally mediates this common form of conAict. It must 
confront the question even if we focus speci@cally on the role of self-trust in belief. 
Zagzebski persuasively argues that our beliefs have an emotional component insofar as 
they are grounded in self-trust. But reAection on such cases seems to reveal an interest-
ing complexity in these emotions. When you resolve conAict in an evidence-avoidant 
direction, as you would in the tactful response to your problem with the gossiping col-
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judgment that you’re trying to discount? Your stance toward this part of you that continues 
to judge that your colleague is gossiping about you exactly resembles your stance toward 
a speaker who without lying tells you this; you acknowledge that the speaker judges 
what she asserts, but you nonetheless mistrust both her judgment (on this matter) and 
her testimony. In the case at hand, you take up such a relation with a part of yourself. If 
the issue were simply the truth-conducive reliability of this part of you that clings to the 
judgment, your self-mistrust would take the form of reopening deliberation on the 
question, which would in turn make it the case that this “clinging to a judgment” mani-
fests dispositions that do not amount to a judgment—for the simple reason that you 
cannot count as both judging that p and deliberating whether p. (I set aside cases in 
which we may want to say that this is possible at di5erent psychological “levels”: for 
present purposes, we may assume that your intellectual conscience works on only one 
level.) We thus see vividly how your self-relations internalize a trust dynamic through a 
developmental process that begins from your trust relations with others. In the intraper-
sonal case, the truth-conducive dimension of trustworthiness drops out, simply because 
you cannot mistrust yourself truth-conducively without reopening deliberation on the 
question. In the intrapersonal case, the custodial relation involves a concern to do justice 
to your own context-sensitive needs, beyond your context-insensitive need to believe 
the truth. In self-mistrust, you retain your judgment that your colleague is gossiping 
about you, but you suspend its force by opening deliberation on the higher-order question 
whether in so judging you do justice to the context-sensitive needs that set the epistemic 
standard for that judgment.
When you resolve such intrapersonal conAict in either direction—whether by over-
coming your mistrust in your judgment or by reining in your mistrusted dispositions 
to judge—you can be said to reason through this transition. 4is usage follows the 
usage in theories of practical reasoning on which “structural rationality” or the “ration-
ality of requirements” (rather than of reasons) mediates the transition from practical 
judgment to such commissive attitudes as intention or choice (see Broome  2013; 
Kolodny 2005; Scanlon 2007). Just as on the practical side you can be said to reason 
through the transition from judging, all things considered, that you ought to φ to 
intending to φ, so on the doxastic side you can be said to reason through the transition 
from judging that p to believing that p. If we put this usage together with our hypothe-
sis, in Section 3, that the normative self-relations at the core of judgment internalize the 
interpersonal normativity at the core of testimony, we get the idea that reasoning sim-
pliciter internalizes the normative relations that the Custodial Model frames as “rea-
soning with” an addressee, by contrast with simply trying to persuade him. How does 
your intellectual conscience enable you to reason in this way—that is, “with yourself ”? 
I’ll conclude with the proposal that your intellectual conscience more generally enables 
you to reason—whether with others or “with yourself ”—by projecting addressees 
whose needs you may or may not feel yourself able to meet. Here is where judgment 
most fundamentally internalizes testimonial relations. Intellectual conscience is not 
merely truth-seeking, and reasoning is not merely truth-preserving: in each case, you 
aim to do justice to context-sensitive need.
trusryourselfin our case
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8. Mere Assertion
4e proposal returns us, at long last, to the claim that I made in the outset: it is possible 
for S to be sincere in her assertion that p while failing to believe that p. We are now ready 
to appreciate the attractions of a subtractive approach to the distinction between testi-
mony and assertion.
It is easy to come up with cases in which S has su7cient reason to judge that p in her 
context and does so judge, but without being entitled to tell A that p: imagine that it 
would take more evidence for the belief to be su7ciently warranted in A’s doxastic con-
text than it would in S’s. Allergy cases show this vividly: my pretty good evidence may 
su7ce for me to believe that this bowl of snacks is nut-free but not for you to believe it, 
given your nut allergy.10 I look to see if the snacks contain nuts before I begin to eat 
because I dislike the taste of nuts. “No nuts,” I conclude, so I scoop up a handful. Now 
you arrive and ask me, “Does the bowl contain nuts?” I’m about to tell you that it does 
not contain nuts, since that’s what I believe, but then I remember your allergy. “I can’t 
say,” I reply. Of course, I could say—and with no impropriety, if I thought you merely 
shared my distaste for nuts. But your allergy imposes a higher standard on my assertion. 
Now Aip the case around and imagine that you’re the speaker, with a severe nut allergy, 
and I’m your addressee, known merely to dislike nuts. You’ve examined the snack bowl 
and are con@dent enough for my needs but not for your own that it does not contain any 
nuts. I ask you if the bowl contains nuts, and you tell me that it does not—despite not 
yourself believing what you assert. Are you insincere? Are you in any respect attempting 
to deceive me? Perhaps your refusal to explain why you are not yourself eating from the 
bowl manifests an attempt to deceive me about your allergy. But that’s a di5erent matter, 
and its relevance to the present issue is merely that it helps distinguish your obligations 
qua asserter from other obligations. (Why, anyway, should I have a right to know about 
your medical status?) 4e topic of our actual conversation is this bowl of snack food, and 
you aren’t attempting to deceive me about that.
4e norm governing assertion and the norm governing judgment may thus give a 
speaker divergent directives: either “assert that p but don’t believe that p” or “believe that 
p but don’t assert that p.”11 4e norms can come apart in these ways because an assertion 
that p is not a mere relation to p but an implicit assurance that relevant others may 
believe that p by recognizing your custodial authority over their epistemic needs, an 
authority grounded in your trustworthiness in doing justice to their needs, both their 
context-sensitive needs and their context-insensitive need to believe the truth.12 If there 
is no addressee—because you’re talking “to yourself ” or rehearsing a speech in the 
shower or reciting your personal Credo—then you don’t give an actual assurance but 
you do perform an act that typically gives an assurance and as such is governed by norms 
that reAect its interpersonal nature—even when performed alone in the shower.
Is it judgment, then, that simply relates you to a proposition? As an addendum, con-
sider again the @nal scene we sketched at the snack bowl, but now imagine that you go 
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on to assert as an aside to your mother, who happens to be standing next to you and is 
well aware of your nut allergy: “. . . still, I don’t believe that the snacks are nut-free.” If 
your mother has also overheard the @rst conjunct of your assertion—“4e snacks are 
nut-free . . .”—as addressed not to her but to me, then she is in position to make norma-
tively cogent sense of your total assertion. You tell me that the snacks are nut-free 
because you regard yourself as able to inform me that they are nut-free, even though you 
do not yourself, in your higher-stakes context, judge that they are nut-free. And your 
mother, we assume, understands what’s going on. Drawing on her understanding of 
how you cope with your allergy, she fully expects that you don’t believe what you tell me 
and therefore isn’t surprised by your aside confessing disbelief. From your mother’s per-
spective, you are meeting your illocutionary obligations at every turn: helping me 
believe what I’m warranted believing in my context, but also helping your mother 
believe what she’s warranted believing in the context that we assume she shares with 
you. We thus get a Moorean assertion that is permissible by the norm of assertion. If we 
imagine your mother residing not by your side but only in your intellectual conscience, 
we see how self-conscious judgment—“. . . still, I don’t believe that the snacks are nut-
free”—may be normatively constrained by your projection of possible addressees with-
out being constrained by how you actually address your assertion.
Within the dialectic that I’ve pursued, what enables us to understand mere assertion 
and perhaps even judgment itself by subtracting—or, more speci@cally, by internalizing—
the interpersonal element from testimony is that we are no longer viewing the speaker as 
intending to give potential addressees a preemptive reason to believe what she asserts. 
As we saw in Section 5, the Command Model leaves out the element that permits this 
subtracting or internalizing maneuver. Crudely put, there can be no normative point in 
issuing a command to a nonactual addressee or in letting your own authority preempt 
itself—assuming those formulations even make sense. 4e Command Model would 
therefore yield an additive approach to assertion and testimony: the claim of authority 
in judgment or assertion is one normative phenomenon, bringing that authority into a 
testimonial relation quite another. If we aim to explain assertion subtractively, we’ll have 
to view its interpersonal nature as custodial.
Notes
 1. 4ough I will assume this (quasi-) Gricean formulation, I don’t mean to rule out the 
 possibility of communication not mediated by recognition of intentions. For present pur-
poses I will assume that any view of testimony that emphasizes the interpersonal element will 
use Gricean formulations. But in a fuller discussion I would reformulate to engage the 
weaker thesis that these intentions must merely be suitably public. (For two defenses of 
such a weaker thesis, see Bar-On [2016, 2018]; and Green [1999; 2007, ch. 3; 2018].)
 2. For negative answers to this question that we’re setting aside, see Darwall (2006, 57, 
123–124); Owens (2006); Lackey (2008, ch. 8); and Schmitt (2010). For a7rmative 
answers, see Moran (2005, 2013); Hinchman (2005, 2014); Faulkner (2011); and McMyler 
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 3. Let me again emphasize (see note  1) that my deployment of the Gricean framework is 
 dialectical. It may well be possible to formulate the Interpersonal View without assuming 
that communication works through the recognition of intentions. But that is far too large 
a task for the present discussion.
 4. Grice (1989, ch. 14). I’ll call this “Quasi-Grice” because Grice did not himself o5er an 
account of testimony. (He o5ers a proto-theory of assertion in Grice [1989, 105 and 
130–131].)
 5. 4e empirical literature appears to show that small children typically assess the credibility 
of a speaker in terms of the likelihood that her testimony is true, not in terms of anything 
speci@cally to do with her intention—which makes sense if small children cannot at trib-
ute intentions. 4is point informs an earlier debate on the capacity of small children to 
receive knowledge through testimony: see Goldberg’s (2008) reply to Lackey (2005). What 
I’m saying here about the “authority of the intention” is in the spirit of how Goldberg 
(2008) conceives a child’s capacity for testimonial knowledge, but the present dialectic is 
di5erent. With our Interpersonalist orientation, the empirical question is not how chil-
dren are guided by their responsiveness to the speaker’s reliability but how they mature 
from recognizing intentions in the @rst sense—which I’m conceding may involve nothing 
more than being guided by the speaker’s reliability—to recognizing them in the second.
 6. For an argument that parallels mine on this point (though without reference to Setiya’s 
worry), see Faulkner (2016).
 7. If you worry about the intelligibility of intending for another’s agency, see my recipe for 
alternative formulations at the beginning of section 2. And again, this isn’t a claim about 
the nature of the reason but about how A acquires it.
 8. We might try to argue that these are not actually beliefs but hypotheses or some other 
 species of subdoxastic state. I will not pursue that issue here, since it doesn’t engage the 
challenge that we’re considering.
 9. Benjamin McMyler (2011, ch. 5) develops a version of the Command Model with this 
alternative emphasis.
 10. I discuss cases with this structure at length in Hinchman (2013).
 11. My argument is not the only way to reach this result. See Goldberg (2015, ch. 6) for a very 
di5erent route to it. My interest lies not merely in this result but in reaching it via my 
subtractive approach to assertion, on which the expression of belief in assertion internal-
izes the transmission of belief in testimony. For one distinctive implication of this 
approach, see the next note (and the works it cites).
 12. 4e core thought here is that there is an epistemic norm of assertion set by the addressee’s 
circumstances: the normative aim of assertion is not simply to express knowledge but to 
give your addressee knowledge. For elaborated versions of this idea, see García-Carpintero 
(2004); Hinchman (2013); and Pelling (2013).
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